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Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) and Corporate Risk Management
Abstract

Prior studies have found mixed relationship between corporate risk management activities and
firm value. In this paper, we document that corporate risk management activities are
significantly affected by the strength of corporate governance. Firms use significantly less
derivatives after the passage of SOX, i.e., when the corporate governance is stronger. The
passage of SOX allows us to implement the difference-in-differences approach and mitigate
endogeneity bias. The relation is both statistically and economically significant. Our findings
shed new light on the agency problem associated with the risk management activities.

Keywords: Corporate risk management, corporate governance, SOX
1. Introduction
It is widely accepted that corporate risk management is an important element of a firm’s
business decision. This is because that in the market with frictions, risk management will
enhance firm values by reducing corporate taxes and expected costs of bankruptcy, and
mitigating the under-investment problem (Smith and Stulz, 1985; Froot, Scharfstein and Stein,
1993). A small group of recent literature in risk management has emphasized the role of
managers in corporate hedging. Researchers argue that increasing hedging activities reduces
future cash flow volatility, thereby raises the expected utility of risk-averse managers whose
personal wealth is tied with future cash flow realization (Morellec and Smith, 2007) and
corporate hedging reduces the cost and reliance of external financing (Tufano, 1998; Kumar and
Rabinovitch, 2011).
In this paper, we investigate the role of corporate governance in corporate hedging.
Researchers have long argued that CEOs have incentives to limit risk taking (Amihud and Lev,
1981). We argue that the risk limiting incentive is particularly strong when corporate governance
system is weak.
After a series of corporate governance failures in 2001 and 2002, especially the Enron
and WorldCom scandals, Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was passed to discipline managers of
publicly listed companies. One of the major provisions of SOX is to require a majority of
independent board of directors. The changes in corporate governance brought about by the
passage of SOX have extensive influences on corporate policies. However, the impact of SOX
on corporate risk management is rarely studied in the literature.
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We hypothesize that firms might use less financial derivatives after the passage of SOX.
Consistent with this proposition, we find that, on average, firms that were not in compliance of
SOX’s requirements before SOX reduce 54% derivatives after the passage of SOX.
While many prior studies focus on the conflict of interest between shareholders and
managers caused by CEO's stock and options holding, we show that corporate governance is also
a determinant of corporate risk management policy. Our study contributes to this line of the
literature by documenting evidence that exogenous shock of strengthened corporate governance
curbs firms’ excessive investments in corporate risk management activities.
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
In a frictionless market, Modigliani and Miller's (1958) work implies that corporate risk
management is irrelevant to firm value. However in the presence of market frictions, corporate
hedging could enhance firm value via reducing expected deadweight costs of bankruptcy,
minimizing tax payments, and mitigating the under-investment problem (Stulz, 1984; Smith and
Stulz, 1985; Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein, 1993).
While theoretical work advocates for the benefits of corporate hedging, empirical findings
are however mixed. For example, Allayannis and Weston (2001) find that firm value is
positively associated with the use of foreign currency derivatives. Carter, Rogers and Simkins
(2006) find that, in the airline industry, hedging jet fuel prices increases firm value. Campello et
al. (2011) suggest that firms that use derivatives pay lower interest rates and are subject to fewer
restrictions in bank loan contracts. On the contrary, Tufano (1996) and Jin and Jorion (2006) find
no evidence that risk management increases firm value in the gold mining industry and the oil
and gas industry. Similarly, Guay and Kothari (2003) find that the gains from hedging for most
firms are small relative to their risk exposures. Brown's (2001) case study analyzes the costbenefit trade-off of a risk management program. He estimates the annual costs to maintain the
foreign currency hedging program to be $3.8 million and the net effect of this program on
operating cash flows and earnings is to reduce annual changes by about $5 million. He argues
that traditional risk management theory is unlikely to fully explain the motivation for the
derivative program.
In this paper, we investigate the role of corporate governance in corporate hedging decision
by examining a rare opportunity, a controlled experiment in the financial markets, namely the
passage of SOX. In particular, SOX requires that publicly listed company to have a majority of
independent board of directors. It is widely accepted that independent directors increase board
oversight and provide effective monitoring. For example, board independence has been found to
significantly affect CEO’s incentive contracts (e.g. Faleye et al., 2011; Coles, et al., 2008), CEO
turnovers (Knyazeva et al., 2013; Guo and Masulis, 2015, etc.), and antitakeover devices
(Brickley, et al., 1994). On the other hand, managers are inclined to overly-investing in risk
management when corporate governance is weak, because managers may exhibit strong risk
aversion to safeguard their undiversified human capital in the firm. For example, Tufano (1998)
argues that cash flow hedging can protect managers from capital market scrutiny, potentially
exacerbating shareholder-manager conflicts. Consistent with this view, Tufano (1998) finds a
positive relationship between hedging and managerial equity ownership. Kumar and Rabinovitch
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(2011) provide a theoretical model and document empirical evidence that corporate hedging is
positively related to CEO entrenchment. As such, we expect that managers without effective
monitoring may want to overly invest in risk managements. The passage of SOX can mitigate the
agency problem by implementing better corporate governance and effective outside monitoring
of independent directors to urge managers to reduce the over-investment. Based on the above
arguments, we propose the following hypothesis:
H0: The passage of SOX has no effect on corporate risk management.
Ha: Corporate risk management activities drop after the passage of SOX.
3. Data, Method and Summary Statistics
In this section, we describe our data and method, and then present summary statistics of
the sample.
3.1. Data and Sample Construction
We start with a sample of S&P 500 firms for a period of 1996 to 2006. We remove
financial and utilities firms since the risk-management incentives of these firms are not
comparable to those of other firms. Firms' accounting information is obtained from the
Compustat database. Board characteristics are retrieved from the RiskMetrics database. After
requiring all the firm-year observations to have the relevant firm-specific variables, information
on board characteristics, and notional value of foreign exchange and interest rate derivatives, we
are left with a sample of 1,719 firm-year observations from 316 firms.
3.2 Measures of Corporate Risk Management
We measure corporate hedging using notional value of foreign exchange and interest rate
derivatives. We obtain derivative information by searching the entire 10-K filings for the
following key words: "risk management", "hedg", "notional", "derivative", and "swap". If a
string is matched to any of these key words, we then read the surrounding paragraphs to extract
information on foreign currency and interest rate derivatives. We collect data on the notional
amount of derivatives used across various derivative instruments such as swaps, forwards,
futures, and options. If there are no hits to any of the key words, we classify the firm as not using
any derivatives.
Among the 316 firms in our sample, 60 firms never use any derivatives, consisting of 677
firm-year observations. In other words, about 81% of firms engage in corporate hedging via
derivatives during the sample period.
3.3 Other control variables
Following Guay and Kothari (2003), we control for leverage, size (Ln(asset)), fraction of
total pay as bonus, sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock price, liquidity (average cash to assets ratio
during the prior three years), cash flow volatility (average absolute change in annual cash flow
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from operation activities divided by assets during the prior three years), and number of business
segments. Detailed variable definitions are described in Appendix A.
3.4. Summary Statistics
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the main variables in a sample of U.S. nonfinancial firms from 1996 to 2006. The variable measuring risk management activities,
Derivative Ratio has a mean of 0.07, a median of 0.01 and a standard deviation of 0.12. The
average Market to book ratio in our sample is 2.57. The book leverage ratio averages 22%. Cash
as a percentage of total assets is 14% on average.
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics
Derivative Ratio
Board size
Ln(Assets)
Book Leverage
Market to book
Cash to asset ratio
Delta
Abs chg of cash flow
# of Segments

N
1719
1719
1719
1719
1719
1719
1566

Mean
0.07
10.37
8.48
0.22
2.57
0.14
2915.17

Std. Dev.
0.12
2.53
1.31
0.15
1.92
0.16
23242.75

25th
0
9
7.64
0.11
1.39
0.02
244.04

Median
0.01
10
8.4
0.21
1.95
0.07
565.91

75th
0.09
12
9.38
0.32
3
0.19
1253.19

1712
1559

0.04
2.6

0.05
1.69

0.01
1

0.03
2

0.06
4

4. Empirical Results
We use the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 as an exogenous shock to the
corporate governance mechanisms for U.S. public firms. It allows us to identify the causal
relationship between corporate governance and corporate risk management. SOX requires public
firms to have a majority of independent directors. In our sample, some firms were already in
compliance with the requirement before the passage of SOX (control group). But other firms
were not in compliance (treatment group) before the passage of SOX, and were forced to make
compliance after 2002. It allows us to use the difference-in-differences (DiD) approach to
compare the changes in risk management activities between firms that were already in
compliance and firms that were not in compliance (see, e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan, 1999,
2003).In particular, we run a model with the following specifications:

(1)
,where i indexes the firm, t indexes the time. In these models, the dependent variable is
, which is calculated as total notional value of foreign exchange and
interest rate derivatives scaled by book value of total assets. Noncompliant board ‘02i is a
dummy variable that equals to one if firm i did not have a majority of independent directors in
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2002 and zero otherwise. Dummy(’03-‘06)t is a dummy variable that equals to one if the
observation is in the period 2003 to 2006 and zero otherwise. The variable of interest,
Noncompliant board ‘02i * Dummy(’03-‘06)t , takes on the value of 1 for companies which did
not have a majority of independent directors for the sample period 2003-2006. In other word, the
variable Noncompliant board ‘02i * Dummy(’03-‘06)t identifies the firm-year observations
which were forced to make compliance due to the passage of SOX. Following prior literature, we
control for size (Ln(asset)), leverage, Market to book ratio and liquidity (cash to assets ratio). We
also include firm dummies and year dummies in all regression.
Table 2: SOX and Risk management
(1)
Derivative
Ratio
-0.038***
(0.010)
-0.000
(0.877)
0.003
(0.610)
0.118***
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.550)
-0.030
(0.270)

(2)
Derivative
Ratio
-0.042**
(0.012)
-0.002
(0.423)
0.005
(0.481)
0.124***
(0.001)
-0.002
(0.364)
-0.033
(0.246)
0.000***
(0.001)

(3)
Derivative
Ratio
-0.039***
(0.008)
-0.000
(0.833)
0.004
(0.542)
0.118***
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.577)
-0.036
(0.198)

(4)
Derivative
Ratio
-0.035**
(0.038)
-0.000
(0.997)
0.005
(0.453)
0.131***
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.490)
-0.047
(0.106)

(5)
Derivative
Ratio
Noncompliant board ‘02
-0.040**
* Dummy ('03 - '06)
(0.032)
Board size
-0.001
(0.534)
Ln(Assets)
0.009
(0.281)
Leverage
0.141***
(0.001)
Market to book
-0.002
(0.337)
Cash to asset ratio
-0.055*
(0.086)
Delta
0.000***
(0.001)
Abs chg of cash flow
0.089*
0.070
(0.066)
(0.144)
# of Segments
0.001
0.001
(0.801)
(0.767)
Firm fixed effect
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year fixed effect
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Constant
0.026
0.029
0.018
0.007
-0.008
(0.660)
(0.655)
(0.762)
(0.915)
(0.911)
Observations
1,719
1,566
1,712
1,559
1,413
Adjusted R2
0.521
0.495
0.522
0.530
0.510
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is
Derivative Ratio, which is calculated as total notional value of foreign exchange and interest rate derivatives scaled
by book value of total assets. ). Noncompliant board ‘02i is a dummy variable that equals to one if firm i did not
have a majority of independent directors in 2002 and zero otherwise. Dummy(’03-‘06)t is a dummy variable that
equals to one if the observation is in the period 2003 to 2006 and zero otherwise. The positive coefficient on the
cross product is consistent with a reduction in a firm’s corporate risk management activities after the passage of
SOX.

The result is reported in Table 2. In columns (1), the coefficient of the interaction term,
Noncompliant board ‘02i * Dummy(’03-‘06)t , is significant and negative, suggesting that SOX is
negatively related to firms’ corporate risk management activities as measured by the notional
value of derivatives. In the model, the dependent variable equals one if the firm use financial
derivatives and zero otherwise. Relative to those firms that are already in compliance of SOX,
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the non-compliance firms reduce derivative ratio by 0.038 on average, which is about 54%
(=0.038/0.07) for an average firm in our sample.
Specifications (2) through (5) incorporate additional control variables to address omitted
variable concerns. The coefficients of these additional variables are consistent with prior
literature (e.g., Guay and Kothari,2003). Including these variables has little effect on the
coefficient of the cross product, Noncompliant board ‘02i * Dummy(’03-‘06)t .
5. Conclusion
We document that corporate risk management activities are significantly affected by the
strength of corporate governance. Firms use significantly less derivatives after the passage of
SOX, i.e., when the corporate governance is stronger. The passage of SOX allows us to
implement the difference-in-differences approach and mitigate endogeneity bias. The relation is
both statistically and economically significant. Our findings shed new light on the agency
problem associated with the risk management activities.

Published by Digital Commons @ Southern University and A&M College, 2022

7

Southern University College of Business E-Journal, Vol. 12 [2022], Iss. 1, Art. 1

References
Allayannis, Y., Weston, J., 2001. The use of foreign currency derivatives and firm market value.
Review of Financial Studies 14, 243–276.
Amihud, Yakov, and Baruch Lev, 1981. Risk reduction as a managerial motive for conglomerate
mergers. Bell Journal of Economics 12, 605-617.
Bertrand, M., Mullainathan , S., 1999, Is there discretion in wage setting? A test using takeover
legislation. Rand Journal of Economics 30, 535–554.
Bertrand, M., Mullainathan , S., 2003, Enjoying the quiet life? Corporate governance and
managerial preferences. Journal of Political Economy 111, 1043–1075.
Brown, Gregory W., 2001. Managing foreign exchange risk with derivatives. Journal of
Financial Economics 60, 401-448.
Brickley, J. A., Coles, L., Terry, R. L., 1994. Outside directors and the adoption of the poison
pills. Journal of Financial Economics 35, 371-390.
Campello, Murillo, Chen Lin, Yue Ma, and Hong Zou, 2011. The real and financial implications
of corporate hedging. The Journal of Finance 66, 1615-1647.
Carter, David A., Daniel A. Rogers, and Betty J. Simkins, 2006. Does hedging affect firm value?
Evidence from the US airline industry. Financial Management 35, 53-86.
Coles, L. J., Daniel, N., Naveen, L., 2008. Boards: Does one size fit all? Journal of Financial
Economics 87, 329-356.
Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., Hoitash, U., 2011. The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of
Financial Economics 101, 160-181.
Froot, Kenneth A., David S. Scharfstein, and Jeremy C. Stein, 1993, Risk Managements
Coordinating Corporate Investment and Financing Policies, The Journal of Finance,
48, 1629–1658.
Guay, Wayne, and Sri Prakash Kothari, 2003, How much do firms hedge with derivatives?
Journal of Financial Economics 70, 423-461.
Guo, L., Masulis, R., 2015. Board structuring and monitoring: New evidence from CEO turnover.
Review of Financial Studies, forthcoming.

https://digitalcommons.subr.edu/cbej/vol12/iss1/1

8

Gu and Yuan: Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)

Jin, Yanbo, and Philippe Jorion, 2006 Firm value and hedging: Evidence from US oil and gas
producers. The Journal of Finance, 61, 893-919.
Kumar, Praveen and Ramon Rabinovitch, 2011, CEO Entrenchment and Corporate Risk
Management, Working paper.
Knyazeva, A., Knyazeva, D., Masulis, R., 2013. The supply of corporate directors and board
independence. Review of Financial Studies 26, 1561-1605.
Modigliani, Franco, and Merton H. Miller, 1958, The cost of capital, corporation finance and the
theory of investment. American Economic Review, 53, 261-297.
Morellec, Erwan, and Clifford W. Smith, 2007, Agency conflicts and risk management. Review
of Finance 11, 1-23.
Stulz, Rene M., 1984. Optimal Hedging Policies. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
19,127-140.
Smith, Clifford W., and Rene M. Stulz, 1985, The Determinants of Firms' Hedging Policies,
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 20, 391–405.
Tufano, Peter, 1998, Agency Costs of Corporate Risk Management, Financial Management, 27,
67-77

Appendix A. Definitions of variables
Variables
Measures of Hedging
Derivative Ratio

Definition

Total notional value of derivatives scaled by book value of total assets

Firm Characteristics
Leverage

Ratio of total debt to book value of total asset

Ln (asset)

Natural logarithm of book value of total assets
Ratio of market value of assets (book value of assets minus book value
of equity plus market value of equity) to book value of total assets

Market to book
Cash to asset

Ratio of cash and short-term investments scaled by total assets

Abs chg of
cash flow

Prior three year average of absolute change in annual cash flow from
operation scaled by total assets
Number of business segments as stated in the Compustat segment
database.
The number of directors on board

# of Segments
Board size
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